The choice of formation

Introduction

According to UEFA's EURO 2020 Technical Report, 15 out of 24 participating teams employed a back three at least once. A stark contrast to the previous version of the tournament, where only four nations (Wales, Northern Ireland, Italy and Germany) used this kind of defensive formation at least occasionally. But four (or in this case, even five) years are a long time, and maybe these changes at international level don't reflect trends in domestic leagues appropriately. And how about the Austrian league, not really known to be tactically innovative?

In order to analyse (starting) formations and their use a bit deeper, I took a look at teams and games from the 2015/16 season onwards until now. This left me with 78 club seasons (three seasons with ten teams and four with twelve). There have been 2428 team games, i.e., 1214 games played with a home and an away team each, of course. Information concerning starting formation is incomplete for seven of them, so I am left with a sample size of 1207. Decent enough.

Transfermarkt, from which I got the data, uses a lot of different ways to categorize formations. In fact, in my sample there are 25 unique versions of them. Some of them obviously don't differ a whole lot (e.g., the "4-4-2 Diamond" and the "4-3-1-2" are basically the same). Others differ only marginally (an offensive 4-3-3 and a more conservative 4-5-1 might just have different heights in which their wingers act). More tactically minded readers might disagree with me, but for the sake of simplicity I decided to ignore those minor details and focus on the bigger picture. Some broader categories were necessary to achieve this.

Two decisive factors in which formations differ are the number of players in the defensive line (i.e., a back three or a back four) and the number of players in the attacking one (whether the team plays with one or two central strikers). Those were the categories I grouped teams along, leaving me with a four-fold matrix every team could be grouped in. Note that for convenience, I count back five defensive lines as back threes and systems with three strikers as lone striker formations, although the tactical experts will, again, diverge on this.

So, let's get started by looking at some simple numbers and averages before delving deeper into more robust analyses. In my sample, the back three was used by 27% of teams' starting formations. The back line with four players was therefore way more popular. Offensive formations were quite equally distributed, by contrast (60% lone strikers and 40% partnerships).

Back three formations were in fact becoming more and more popular during the first half of the time span in my sample, in fact. The percentage of starting formations using a back three rose from just over 10% in 2015/16 to more than 40% in 2018/19. It did however remain at this peak and fell back in the following years. For the current season, the figure is almost exactly at the long-term average. Back four formations have been, by definition, becoming more popular since 2019 and are back to the levels of 2017/18 in the current season.

By contrast, in offensive terms there was a much steadier development in terms of the choice of formations. Lone striker formations were something of a holy grail in the earlier days (six years ago). Three out of four starting line-ups featured just one central striker back then. But, since then they have been declining in popularity ever since, with the exception of a dip during the 2017/18 season (the last one with ten teams in the upper tier and no play-offs, by the way). For the second consecutive season now, lone striker formations are actually a minority choice now and double strikers are the new normal, although the differences in usage are rather small (54% strike partnerships vs. 46% lonely boys up front).

Teams and coaches

In terms of individual teams, LASK were during a long time the blueprint of the back three trend in the Bundesliga. Between 2018/19 and 2020/21 they used this defensive formation in every single league game. No other team has used a back three throughout a whole season, and only twenty out of 78 sides have used it in a majority of games. The only teams in the current season to do so are again LASK (56%) and Ried (83%).

Those two teams are also the two leading ones in the overall ranking and the only ones which applied a back three in more than half of games in the sample. Only three other teams with more than one full season (St. Pölten, Altach and Sturm Graz) have used a back three in at least one quarter of their games. On the other hand, out of regular participants in the upper tier serial champions RB Salzburg are the team which most sticks to a back four, using a three-man defence only in approximately one out of 20 games.

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Interestingly, they are also the team most prone to using a strike partnership, having used either a 4-2-2-2 or a 4-Diamond-2 formation almost without exception during the last few years. Wolfsberger AC, another team that used almost exclusively back four formations, were also keen to field two strikers in their starting formations.

Other teams that used more double striker than lone striker formations were Altach and Wattens, but they were just as well exceptions to the rule. All the other teams used lone strikers predominantly, reflecting that these were standard choices during most of the time span from 2015/16 onwards.

There won't be much of a surprise when it comes to teams and the formations they faced. Wacker Innsbruck's only year in the first league during the sample was 2018/19, the year the usage of back-three formations peaked. The fact that in relative terms they played against this form of defensive line-up the most is therefore no astonishment. Much more interesting are the teams that follow. Red Bull Salzburg, the serial winners (in fact, no other team won the competition since 2013) and LASK were among the best teams of the league in any year. There is however no real pattern to detect in terms of formations faced, and variance is much lower than in formations used.

Individual coaches do show a whole lot more of variation in terms of formations choice. In order not to report too much noise, I excluded head coaches with fewer than 20 games in charge during the past six and a half seasons. 

There are some who stick to their preferred choice throughout (such as Valérien Ismaël, Paul Gludovatz and Dominik Thalhammer, fierce advocates for back lines of three defenders) or Jesse Marsch, the only one never to renounce his double striker system. There are others who mix their choices quite equally (Damir Canadi sticks out in both categories). But in general, most coaches follow the overall trend. More than half of managers have used the back three in less than one quarter of their games in charge, and a majority of them opted for a lone striker in around three out of five games they were responsible for.

Explaining the choice

So far, we have looked at some rather descriptive statistics, which don't explain a whole lot. We have seen that some teams are more prone to others to apply a certain starting system, and there are some coaches that tend to opt for again a certain formation. There was also a clear long-term trend towards double-striker formations and for some time, back threes were becoming more popular. But these figures only tell us what teams and coaches have been doing, and not so much why they were doing it.

In the reminder of this entry, I will investigate three possible explanations as to which formation a team uses in a given game and why it might change from their standard choice to a different one: venue, the opposition's formation and the strength of the opposition.

Venue might be an obvious factor: home teams are typically favourites to win the game, therefore they should on average attack more and field more attacking players (so for instance, only two central defenders instead of three). Away teams on the other hand might be happy with containing their opponents, fielding more defensive players who would help to secure a draw. We could therefore in principle suspect significant differences between home and away teams in terms of formation choice.

Looking at the data in terms of defensive formation in my sample through this hypothesis, there is however no real distinction to be made between them. The tendencies are by contrast almost equal for both home and away teams. Home teams (continuous lines in the graphs) were actually a bit more inclined towards a back three (blue lines) than their counterparts in the 2015/16 season, but then sticked to back-four formations a bit more afterwards. The peak in back-three usage saw home teams applying them more than away, but differences were as usual rather small. In the current season, there is virtually no difference between home and away teams.

 

This picture is only slightly different in terms of offensive formations. Home teams had always been more inclined than their counterparts towards two-striker systems (blue lines), at least before the pandemic seasons. Their usage of this kind of formation was however basically unchanged during the last four season. What has changed was the offensive choice of away teams, who went from using a single striker in 60% of games to lining up two central attackers in a majority of games.

These facts only tell us so much and are obviously not enough to explain formation choice. But, since the differences are minor yet obviously not completely at random, I will discriminate home and away teams analytically in the remainder of this entry.

Opposition formations

Teams might also vary their tactics according to the opposition they face, to counter specific threats or exploit weaknesses. For example, a team that will play an opponent that uniquely fields two central strikers might be more inclined towards fielding three central defenders to always have a spare man at the back. This would allow them to play one against one defensively and have one man to cover his teammates, but it could also be beneficial for their build-up play.

We look therefore at teams' formation as a function of their opponents'. As a first step, we analyse the distribution of formation combinations in our sample. As we can see, all the 16 possible formations (2 of each offensive and defensive formations for both home and away teams, i.e., the number of possible combinations is 2*2*2*2) are to be found in the 1207 games we consider.

Most of them (actually, the four most common formations) include games where both teams applied a back four (662 games, 55% of games in our sample). Only 9% of games (111) saw both teams field three central defenders.

But more important are the interactions of offensive and defensive formations. Therefore, let's assume for a moment that opposition starting systems are stable (which they mostly are as we shall see, but a team could also anticipate a formation change and vary therefore themselves).

When home teams face a back four team, they play with a loan striker in 61% of games (almost exactly the long-term average). However, when face with a back three, they opted for a single central forward only in about every other game (53%). The relationship between defensive formation of away teams and offensive structure of home teams is statistically significant.

The opposite is not true. Away teams also tend to opt more often for a lone striker formation. They did so in 61% of games, but the differences between games against a back three (59%) and against a back four (62%) are rather down to noise than to substance.

Which of course in any case tells us nothing about the causal link. It might be that home teams vary their offensive formation depending on away teams or just the other way round (the data allows for both interpretations). In the end, this is a game played by actors. Therefore, modelling change in formation choice makes more sense than the use of formations.

Modelling changes and opponent quality

To start with, the data shows that teams don't choose formations on a regular basis. The most important predicator when running multivariate models on a teams' formation in a given game is always the same teams' formation in other games. It seems however that home teams are slightly more likely to change their formation anticipating their opponents' system then vice versa, but not the way you might suppose. They actually tend to mirror their oppositions formation, i.e., are more likely to field a back three against a back three and a strike partnership if their visitors also tend to use this offensive structure. But are these really formation changes?

I define a formation change in a particular game if a team uses the other variant in more than 60% of games, independent of whether this percentage was reached before or after the specific match. This is not completely clean (as a third game in a row with a back three in a season in which the team otherwise only used four-man defences would still count as a switch to a back three), but it leaves me with sufficient material.

In the 1207 games in my sample, home teams switched to a back 3 in 64 occasions and made the opposite move 43 times. Away teams were slightly happirt to switch, changing and chopping on 117 occasions (71 towards a back three, 46 to a back four). In offensive terms, change happened even more often. Home teams switch from single-striker formations to two central forwards on 136 times and reduced their front line to one 59 times, away teams made these moves 121 and 73 times, respectively. The total sum of offensive switches is identical for home and away teams.

Our final factor to consider when explaining formation choice and change is team quality. I use the goal difference for all the other games during the respective season to assess the relative strength of both teams. This is again a bit of a trick (since it uses information of games played afterwards) but is still a sufficient indicator of team quality.

Now we are ready to assess why teams change formations. Home teams, which looked more prone to changing formations according to their opponents' systems, actually change predominantly according to the difference in relative strength. Only in case of a switch towards a back three, the opposition formation also plays a role. They are both more likely to switch to a back three when playing stronger opposition and when playing against a team with the same offensive formation. On the other hand, a switch towards a back four is not explained by any of the factors in my model.

Offensive changes by home teams are both influenced by team rating, and interestingly, both in the same direction. Playing against a stronger team makes home sides more unlikely to switch their offensive patterns, whether they usually field one or two central strikers.

When factoring the difference in quality appropriately, we also see that away teams do change their defensive formation in anticipation of their opponents. Playing against a team that usually fields two central strikers makes away teams more likely to switch to a back three, independent of their opposition's quality. As in the case of home teams, switches to a back four seem to happen quite randomly.

In case of facing stronger opposition, away teams also tend to switch towards a two-striker system, independent of home teams' offensive and defensive formation. To understand the specific reasons behind these moves would be a fascinating question to ask some experts on tactics. A switch from a double to a lone striker system is however not explained by any of the variables in my models.

Predicting formations, choosing appropriately and problems for specific teams

We can use our models and findings for some cool stuff. Suppose you are working as a coach or analyst for a team and want to know the most likely formation your next opponent might field. Of course, you could look at videos of their previous games (say, for instance their last five games) and guess how they will play. This is valuable information and will work fine most of the times. But imagine your upcoming opponent is tactically quite flexible and you are having a hard time finding patterns in their formation use, both home and away. With a little script and spending a few minutes running the code instead of various hours watching videos you can gain additional information, which might back up or (more interesting) contradict your qualitative evaluation.

The data can tell you the most likely defensive and offensive formation of your opponent (and also, your own) just as in the table above. Plus, you could also evaluate the likelihood that they will deviate from their previous formations (not reported in table).

Knowing (with a little bit more certainty than from just watching games) their formation will then be useful to choose your own. As we have seen, clubs do not tend to chop and change too much in terms of the formations they apply, but suppose you are flexible enough to choose between various options.

Unfortunately, even advanced models cannot show us a magical formula, but there is reason to suppose that a striker partnership would be a good choice for away teams, given that its application has historically led them to perform a bit better than expected given teams' relative strength.

But to console you, you could still look at some numbers comparing results to expectations and evaluate them according to the tactical choices taken. For instance, you would find out that Ried, although usually quite enthusiastic about back threes, have won 13 of 29 home games with a back four. This amounts to four wins more than expected given their opponents strength. On the other hand, Austria Wien have lost 34 of 82 home games with a back four, again 4 more than expected.

To end this game, I tell you a possible way to halt the best team in the league. RB Salzburg have faced a back three in 41 away games. They were expected to win 25 of them, but managed "only" 22 wins. Meanwhile, at home they won more games than expected against both three- and four-man defences. So, when you welcome them the next time, convince your coach, field your additional centre-back and hope for the best.

 

Note: As always, click on graphs to increase their size.

Challenging J. Hart

The task ahead for Wolfsberger AC is huge. They will face Tottenham, one of the best teams of the group stages in the round of 32. To make matters worse, their "home" game will be played in Budapest and their best player is falling out with his head coach, starting only one of the three games before the European clash.

Are there any chances for WAC in the clash? Well, not really. According to fbref.com, Tottenham have created the joint-most expected goals in the Europa League group stage (alongside fellow London club Arsenal) and were the fifth-best team in terms of xG conceded. Along the way, they outplayed WAC's domestic rivals LASK two times, although they only managed to turn that into one win and one draw. 

Compare that to the carinthians' numbers, and you see that there is not only a difference in terms of budget and squad quality, but also in performances. Only Dundalk and Qarabaq Agdam created less xG than them, both of which finished their respective group in last position. Both in terms of chances created and conceded (penalties excluded), WAC were actually the worst team in their group, making it a remarkable achievement to reach the round of last 32 teams.

The only true weakness (besides underestimating their opponents and arrogance, but you wouldn't rely on those) and therefore focal point could be Tottenham's usual starting keeper in European matches, Joe Hart. The former Manchester City player has started five of the six group stage games this season and conceded already around one goal more than an average keeper would given the shots he faced. One might argue that five games and three post-shot xG are too small a sample size to draw any conclusions, but in fact Hart also underperformed expectations at his previous clubs West Ham and Burnley, where he played more games.

Likewise, SmarterScout rates him below average in terms of shot stopping, both in the case of open play as well as set-pieces. When rated against the average goalkeeper in the Europa League, he features especially bad against headers (7 resp. 8 on a scale from 0 to 99). So, there is definitely a weakness to exploit. Both teams are at the same level in terms of aerial duels won, hence the way to go could be working the ball forward, crossing it into the box and trying to force Hart into saves which he does not perform at a high level. Given that Wolfsberg are the team with the second-highest amount of long balls played in the group stage, they should be able set up a direct and aerials-based match plan.

For this to happen, they will however have to shoot. They shot 8.5 times in the group stage games, coincidentally the same number Spurs conceded. Whether this will be enough remains to be seen.

A clash of styles

Salzburg's upcoming opponent Villarreal, having installed Unai Emery as their new head coach last summer, have since then changed their style towards a more passive and patient way of play. They have more of the ball and pass it more than last season, but they are shooting almost three times per game less than in the previous year. Their gain in possession serves more as a defensive tool, in that they are keeping the ball to prevent their opponents from creating chances. According to numbers by fbref.com, they have been able to reduce the number of shots conceded per game from around 12 to nine. This improvement is reflected in their underlying numbers. Meanwhile their expected goals per game in league games fell only slightly from 1.5 to 1.44, they reduced their xG conceded from 1.17 to 0.87. This amounts on average to a goal every three games, or around twelve goals conceded less over the course of a season.

Their change in approach has also affected their pressing games. While they were the seventh-most active team in pressing opponents last season in La Liga, they fell to the eleventh position in this regard in the current year. Although they do try to win the ball back a little more in higher areas of the pitch, in the first and second third of the pitch they put their opponents under much less pressure when out of possession than last year.

In the Europa League, they are even the least active team out of possession out of all teams which made it into the group stages. They pressured their opponents only 106 times per game, almost one hundred occasions less per game than the most active team in this regard (Salzburg's Austrian fellows Wolfsberger AC). One might argue that high levels of pressure are not paramount to their style of play given their high levels of possession, but the relationship between much possession and little pressing is not straightforward. Leverkusen for instance, who enjoyed one percentage point more possession than Villarreal, were the fifth-most pressing team in the group stage.

Their more passive approach might rather be a conscious choice, given the congested fixture list this season with less room to recover between games. It did however not affect their performances negatively; they created the fifth-most expected goals and where even the most defensively sound teams of the 48 in the group stage, allowing their opponents only 0.46 xG per game (all data for non-penalty shots).

Salzburg, on the other hand, couldn't play more differently. Their high-risk, high-reward style of play when having the ball causes them to have less possession than their opponents in this year's CL group stage and to be among the teams with the lowest pass success rate (only three of 32 teams completed less of their passes). After winning the ball back, they try to get it forwards as quickly as possible, not paying too much attention to possession and pass success figures.

Yet against the ball, they are among the most active teams. They disrupt their opponents' passes at the third-best rate of all teams in the group stage, behind only Ajax and Bayern. When their opponent has the ball, they are the second-most active team, tackling and pressing like wild all over the pitch. Only their partner club RB Leipzig has worked even more actively against the ball during the six games of the group stage. Although they left the competition, finishing third in their group which also included Bayern and Atlético, their style was equally successful; they created the third-most non-penalty expected goals of all teams and were an average team defensively (1.19 xG conceded per game). With luck a little more on their side, they could have easily made it to the round of last 16.

So, Thursday's encounter will likely be a clash of football styles, with Villarreal trying to keep the ball, move it around patiently and attack without taking to many risks. Salzburg will play their part, hunt the ball on every opportunity and look for the most direct way to goal after winning it back. The game will most likely be won by the team which is better in focusing on what they can and less on what the opponent wants them to.

One detail which could be decisive is the role of the goalkeepers. Salzburg will field Cican Stankovic, who is at least now not questioned by the club. Villarreal have played all international games so far with Geronimo Rulli instead of regular starter Sergio Asenjo. In order to evaluate his style of play. With Rulli playing, Villarreal have been the team to have their keeper the most short passes of all teams in the EL Group Stage, in line with their general focus on possession. Less than one fifth of Rulli's passes in open play have been long, and this is not down to him being unable to play them. His completion rate for long passes (more than 40 yards) is actually the highest of all goalkeepers in the Europa League.

His strengths with both feet are somehow balanced by some weaknesses as a shot-stopper. Analysing data from SmarterScout, we can see him having some deficits concerning the more classic facets of goalkeeping. Their model rates him below average in saving non-headed shots from both open play as well as set pieces and headers in open play. The only category in which he excels is stopping headers from dead balls from going in, so maybe Salzburg should not rely too much on set-pieces. But getting their strikers, especially Sekou Koita who is rated way above average in finishing non-headed shots in open play by their model, into decent shooting positions to challenge Rulli could be a promising strategy.

Salzburg: Could their defensive weakness cost them the title?

Although they finished the first part of the season in first place, they cannot be wholly satisfied with the way things are going. They lead the table only by goal difference and average only slightly more than two points per game, their lowest tally in recent years. Even last season, when they went into the Play-Offs technically six points behind their opponents LASK, they had a better point average, more goals scored and less goals conceded.

Their current problems are mainly down to defensive issues. They have conceded 15 goals in 12 league games, which is way more than their competitors Sturm (five goals conceded in the same period) and LASK (ten). From a historic perspective, their troubles become more evident: for the first time since the start of the 2016/17 season, they are averaging more than one goal conceded per game. This holds for both expected (1.15) and actual (1.25) goals.

We can see from this number that some of this is down to variation, given that they concede more goals than an average team would. But the difference of 0.1 per game amounts to only two goals in the course of the regular season, so not a huge factor to explain their worrying trends.

The issue was more pronounced in their international campaign. They finished third in the Champions League group and will therefore continue in the Europa League in February. Finishing in this position was however a bit more unfortunate than their current league standing. According to FBREF, they conceded 17 gaols from 8.7 expected ones. Their underlying performances had them as an only slightly below average (8.4 xG conceded) team, but their number of actual goals conceded was the second worst of the 32 teams in the group stage. Accordingly, no team had a higher percentage of xG that ended in goal (195%) or a bigger difference between expected (+2.7) and actual (-7) goal difference. They also had the best xG-difference in their group, topping reigning Champions League winners Bayern Munich (+2.4) and current La Liga leaders Atlético Madrid (+0.3).

Their domestic numbers this year leave them however only in 14th position in terms of expected goals per game conceded, out of a total of 56 club seasons in the league since 2016. They find themselves behind teams like Altach 2016/17 and LASK 2017/18, which both finished fourth. Another indicator of their relative weakness is that four of the six best teams in this ranking were previous versions of their own club.

 

The only conclusion from these numbers is that they have to improve defensively if they are to win the league yet again. But preparation during the winter break (which normally lasts around two months in Austria) was shortened to two weeks this year due to the full calendar, so the question remains if they were able to work a lot on the issue. They also did not do very much on the transfer market to alleviate their problems, bringing back in only defensive all-rounder Bernardo on loan from Brighton. At the same time, central defender Jérôme Onguéné left the club also on loan towards Genoa CFC.

So we can expect that their defensive numbers won't change much in the near future, which makes their offensive output the more important. The graph shows the expected number of points per game for different levels of expected goals per game scored, maintaining their current number of xG per game conceded at the fixed level. The vertical dotted lines show the actual levels of xG scored for the current and last two previous seasons.

If they keep scoring the same way, they are expected to finish the season with around 2.25 points per game, which in turn would be approximately 47 points after the end of the Play-Offs (note that points after the regular season are halved). This would be less than 2018/19 (52) and 2020/21 (50), but would in both years still have been enough to win the title.

The problem with these metrics is that until now, there are two teams in the league with also outstanding numbers, nearly reaching Salzburg's performance levels. LASK and Rapid (both not playing international football anymore, which might be a slight advantage), will challenge them in the upcoming months. This was not the case at the same level in previous years. If Salzburg are to overcome this challenge, they will have improve their defensive work and decrease the chances they concede to a lower level.

LASK: How have they evolved under Thalhammer?

After a run of bad results and a decline of performances after restart, the club decided that the coach had to go. Although the rumours of Valerien Ismael being sacrified in order for the club board did not completely silence, the appointment of Dominik Thalhammer made sense in sporting terms. He had led the Austrian Women's national team to unprecedented heights, reaching the semifinals of the 2017 Euros. Given that the squad was predominantely kept together, he was able to build and develop it further.

By looking at some stylistic metrics, we can compare the type of football the new head coach (who at the same time is also the sporting director) has implemented with the previous regime. I use the popular radar graphs for this purpose, which report twelve different indicators. These are broadly grouped into three subcategories: 

With the ball:

• Possession
• Pass success
• High possession (passes in the final third)
• Long balls (as a percentage of all passes played)
• Crosses (per 100 passes played)

Against the ball and transition

• Pressing frequency (number of interceptions and clearances per game)
• Pressing intensity (interceptions and clearances per minute out of possession)
• Opponent pass success
  
• Transition speed (number of passes played per shot)

Performances

• Total Shot Ratio (TSR)
  
• Shot on Target Ratio (STR)
• xG-Difference

 

Comparing last year's and current season's radar, we can actually see some remarkable differences, especially concerning they game with the ball. Average possession went up from 56% to 61% and their pass success rate from 69% to 75%. The number of passes in the opponent third is basically unchanged, indicating that they keep the ball a bit more in deeper positions. This is further underlined by the percentage of long balls, which fell from 19% under Ismael to 14% under Thalhammer. Conversely, they play more crosses: from five crosses per 100 passes last year to six during the current season. 

Their approach towards the opposition goal is also a little less direct; meanwhile they played on average 3.6 passes before each shot in 2019/20, now they shoot after 3.7. Not a huge difference, but still in line with a slightly more patient game.

Concerning their game without the ball, we observe a little paradox. They are pressing less, both in absolute and in proportional terms, but still they are able to interrupt their opponents' play: meanwhile last year 39% of their opponents' passes were unsuccessful, this year they are intercepting 41%. Closing passing lanes and forcing their opponents into bad decision instead of a more direct approach in pressing seems to be the new lemma.

In terms of performances, their game has improved even more from an already high level. They are scoring one expected goal per game more than they concede. A healthy figure, although they are beaten in this regard by champions RB Salzburg and maybe title-challengers SK Rapid.

Can they themselves challenge for the title win? Their numbers are, in spite of the changes in style, largely at the same level as they were last year during the regular season, which they finished in first position, leading by six points. If it had not been for their training scandal and the subsequent point deduction, they could have at least finished better than they ultimately did (in fourth place). Their challenge will therefore be to not experience a similar drop in performances after another excellent regular season and to maintain their level in the Play-Offs.

Rapid: Can they challenge for the title this year?

Their last league title dates back to 2008. Since then, they have finished in second position six times, three times in third position and thrice outside the top four. The hunger for the league title is big at Rapid and the chances they can win it this time are definitely not lost, although they finished the calender year in fourth position. They sit only one point behind the league leaders and their underlying numbers are quite promising.

On the attacking side of their game, they have created 2.23 xG per game so far this season, their best output since the beginning of the 2016/17 season (they have created more in the 2018/19 lower Play-Offs, but faced significantly worse opponents therein). In comparison to last year's regular season, they have created around 0.3 xG per game more, which adds up to around seven goals over the course of 22 games.

Defensively, they are also quite stable and allowed their opponents slightly more than one expected goal per game, which is around at the the level of the 2016/17 and 2017/18 seasons, in which they had their best defensive record during the last few years. In terms of league-wide comparison, they are the second-best team in the league in both disciplines, bettered offensively only by RB Salzburg (2.36 xG created per game) and LASK (1.01 xG conceded).

Although expected goals do not tell us the whole story, they are an important indicator of a team's performance level. Therefore, the numbers tend to correlate quite strongly with teams' final league position. By comparing their numbers this year with those of other high-quality teams of late, we can evaluate their chances to challenge for the title in the current season. The graph shows the top 10 teams since the 2016/17 season (out of a total of 56), ranked by their average xG-difference, and their rank in the final league table.

We can see that the team of headcoach Kühbauer are beaten only by two versions of RB Salzburg, both this and the previous year. Their offensive output is likewise the third-highest of all teams, although there have been some more defensively sound teams. We can therefore conclude that they are definitely in the title race.

Their problem is that not only this year's version of RB Salzburg is in this list, but also two other direct rivals, LASK and Sturm Graz (albeit the latter already quite some levels behind). This is a wider reflection of a general trend this season. The total number of expected goals has risen by about 0.25 per game in comparison to last season. We also observe the highest xG values per game (3.15) since 2016. Post-pandemic football has turned into a chance festival, which is why most teams create more expected goals than last year.

Therefore, the question whether Rapid's better numbers are down to an actual improvement or rather due to a more general trend, remains open. But, given their stats in comparison to the rest of the league, they could finish this season with the best rank since 2008.

Sturm: Is Ilzer their best head coach of the last years?

Half a year after finishing last season on a historic low, losing nine out of ten games in the upper Play-Off and conceding more than three goals a game on the run, Sturm Graz are back in business. They go top of the table if they win the game against WAC that they have in hand. So far, they are the only team to lose only one game this season and are the most stable side with only five goals conceded in eleven matches (the second-best side is on ten goals conceded). Their goal difference is the second best of the league after champions RB Salzburg.

Although their underlying numbers indicate that they are overperforming quite heavily (+17 actual goal difference from a +8.4 expected one), their rise is quite remarkable. Last season, their underlying numbers were those of a team from the lower half of the table, incapable of competing for higher laureates. Now they have the fourth best xG difference and clearly belong in the upper third of the table. They did this despite not spending a penny on new signings, relying on free agents and loan moves. 

This passive approach leaves only their new head coach as a possible explanation for their improvement. Christian Ilzer was appointed after Nestor El Maestro was sacked for both on and off-field reasons and interim coach Thomas Hösele managed to lose all three games in charge (5:12 goal difference). Ilzer himself had had a quite underwhelming season at Austria Vienna, which ended with the loss of the Europa Qualification Play-Offs after winning the lower Play-Offs. But in general terms, he was still highly regarded after getting Hartberg promoted to the highest league for the first time in their history and leading WAC to European honours the two previous years.

After frequent changes in this position (he is their fifth permanent head coach since the start of the 2016/17 season), Sturm seem to have found their man. Out of this group of five coaches, he has the highest point and goals scored average, plus his team is by long way the most stable one (less than half a goal per game conceded). Although these numbers should regress somewhat to their mean, underlying performances have been no less impressive given last year's benchmark.

He is also the coach with the highest expected goal difference per game. His team scores more than half an expected goal per game more than those of Heiko Vogel (who got sacked midway the 2018/19 season) and Franco Foda (who lead them to the top of the table at Christmas 2017 before being appointed manager of the Austrian national team). The men in charge after Vogel's sacking (Roman Mählich and Nestor El Maestro) were both known for a rather reactive style of play and did not manage to reach the levels of their predecessors (both had a negative expected goal difference).

Interestingly and contrary to the actual numbers, the team's improvement under Ilzer is largely down to their increased offensive production. They score almost two expected non-penalty goals per game, which is largely in line with their actual output (exactly two goals per game). On the defensive side, his team is only the third best of the sample with around 1.15 xG per game conceded. Under both Foda and Vogel, the club allowed their opponents slightly less (1.08 xG per game). 

 

Given the actual numbers this season are way below that (0.45 goals conceded on average) and are based on a still relatively small sample of only eleven games, the team might fall back a bit and may be short of battling for the title this year. But they have improved massively under their new head coach and should make it into Europe easily.